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 Since price discrimination and selling below cost arise in the normal course of business and 
are usually legal for home firms, countering these practices by foreign firms provides a very 
weak rationale for antidumping duties. If antidumping duties were to provide a systematic 
defense against predation by foreign firms, however, a strong ''fair-trade'' justification would 
remain. This paper adapts the classic entry-deterrence analysis of Dixit (1979) and Brander 
and Spencer (1981) to provide a simple treatment of predation, which is applicable with price 
leadership as well as quantity leadership. Although situations of cross-border predation appear 
to be quite rare, foreign firms may sometimes find themselves in leadership positions if they 
have to make shipments and/or set prices before their home rivals. This paper shows that, in 
the context of such an international leadership game, predation may occur without dumping 
and vice versa. Further, when dumping and predation do coexist, a sophisticated form of 
antidumping duty would prevent predation, but the simple antidumping duties that are 
generally observed in practice will often be insufficient. Consequently, the paper challenges 
the ''fair-trade'' view of antidumping policy as an antidote for predation and strengthens the 
foundation of the counter-argument that antidumping constitutes a new insidious form of 
protectionism and trade harassment, which is of particularly serious concerns for small 
countries.  
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 1  Introduction 
The declared intent of antidumping policy is to protect home industries from unfair 
competitive practices by foreign firms. In practice, according to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) antidumping Agreement, price-based dumping occurs when the foreign 
firm sells at lower price in the home country market than in the foreign market, while cost-
based dumping occurs when the foreign firm sells at a price lower than its average cost in the 
home country market. When there is an evidence of both dumping and material injury to the 
home industry, the home country may implement antidumping duties, which eliminate the 
dumping margin.
1 Antidumping policies have become extremely controversial. In 
recessionary periods, home firms may frequently sell at prices less than average cost without 
fear of sanctions, while their foreign counterparts may face antidumping duties. Further, 
many, though not all, forms of price discrimination are fully legal for home firms within the 
home market. While it is, thus, hard to argue that price discrimination or selling below 
average cost is unfair per se, proponents of antidumping policy frequently argue that recourse 
to punitive tariffs is necessary to prevent blatantly unfair predatory practices by foreign firms. 
This paper investigates whether antidumping duties are likely to be a reasonable antidote 
when there is a threat of predation by foreign firms. 
Concerns over possible predation by foreign firms have a long history. For example, 
according to Viner (1931, p. 51-64), in the early twentieth century the evidence seems to 
suggest that Germany systematically undertook dumping in a variety of industries, because 
large-scale cartels in Germany shared dumping costs while high tariffs in Germany prevented 
foreign competitors from lowering the high home prices. Many countries, thus, adopted 
antidumping measures against large German cartels, which were accused of eliminating 
competition in their home markets. In the 1980s, Japan began to dominate the semiconductor 
industry by charging low prices in international markets (Baldwin 1994). The U.S. 
government alleged, somewhat problematically, that dumping by Japanese firms was forcing 
American semiconductor producers out of business and, thus, an antidumping action was 
initiated against Japanese semiconductor industry. 
                                                 
1The WTO antidumping Agreement sets forth procedural requirements for the implementation of antidumping 
measures, including the calculation of the extent of dumping and the determination of injury. Further, once 
antidumping duties are in place, the authorities may conduct periodic reviews of the antidumping measures on 
their own initiatives or upon request home firms. Antidumping duties normally terminate no later than five years 
after first being applied, unless a review investigation prior to that date establishes that expiry of the duty would 
be likely to lead to continuation or resumption of dumping and injury. Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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Questions concerning the efficacy of antidumping policy are becoming increasingly important 
at present as the use of such measures proliferate. Before the WTO antidumping Agreement 
came into effect in 1995, antidumping measures were implemented primarily by a small 
number of developed countries including the U.S., Australia, the E.U., and Canada (see Prusa, 
2001, 595, Table 1). In contrast, since 1995 many developing countries, such as Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, have enacted antidumping legislation and have 
become frequent users of antidumping measures according to the WTO website. WTO 
statistics also reveal that the average number of new antidumping duties implemented per year 
by WTO members increased by over 80% from 88 in the period of 1987-1994 to 162 in the 
period of 1995-2006. The upward trend in the use of antidumping measures is shown in Fig. 
1. Among a total of 1,940 antidumping measures reported to the WTO from 1995 to 2006, 
there were several prominent new users as well as traditional users in the ``top'' group of 
countries: India (331), the U.S. (239), the E.U. (231), Argentina (150), South Africa (120), 
Canada (87), Australia (71), and Brazil (66). Over the same period, the most frequent target of 
anti dumping measures was China (375) followed by South Korea (136), Taiwan (106), the 
U.S. (104) and Japan (97). In addition, the sectors most affected by antidumping actions were: 
base metals (31%), chemicals (20%), plastics (13%), textiles (8%), machinery and equipment 
(8%) and pulp of wood (4%). 
 
Figure  1: The poliferation of antidumping measures 
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division antidumping Measures Database 
To address the issue of whether antidumping duties provide a solid defense against predation 
by foreign firms, we adapt the Stackelberg entry deterrence model, pioneered by Dixit (1979) 
and Brander and Spencer (1981) to provide a simple one-period analysis of predation. The 
foreign firm is assumed to be a monopoly in the foreign market, but it plays a quantity-setting 
game with its home-firm rival in  the home-country market. Further, we consider the 
interesting, though likely infrequently occurring, situation where the foreign firm is a first Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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mover by virtue of having to ship goods before the home firm. The foreign firm may use this 
position to force the home firm out of the market or to accommodate participation of the 
home firm. Such ``predatory behaviour'' by the foreign firm is clearly harmful to the home 
firm and may be perceived as unfair. Higher marginal costs for the foreign firm increase the 
relative attractiveness of accommodation. Thus, in situations where the foreign firm would 
engage in predation, a sufficiently high anti-predation tariff could be levied to induce 
accommodation and allow the participation of the home firm. 
This paper shows t hat under some circumstances, an antidumping duties would be 
implemented in the absence of predation, and under other circumstances, no dumping duty 
would be imposed in the presence of predation. Even if both predation and dumping by 
foreign firms coexist, a standard antidumping duty, of the type used in practice, may not be 
sufficient to preclude predation. The reason is that the height of the anti-predation tariff relies 
only on the home market conditions, while the height of an antidumping duty depends on both 
the home and foreign market conditions. Interestingly, when predation and dumping coexist, a 
sophisticated antidumping duty, which anticipates firm behaviour and eliminates dumping in 
a single iteration, can prevent predation in those cases where the foreign firm produces a limit 
quantity just large enough to keep the home firm out of the market. The onerous 
computational requirements of such sophisticated antidumping duties coupled with the need 
for dumping and limit-quantity predation to initially coexist, however, vitiate the practical 
importance of this result. These overall results of this modeling exercise, therefore, suggest 
that antidumping duties cannot be justified as a policy mechanism to prevent predatory 
behavior by foreign firms. 
In addition, to being harmful to the home firm, predation is typically thought to be harmful to 
national welfare in the foreign country since there are fewer firms in the market. 
Consequently, we also extend welfare analysis in Brander and Spencer (1981) to address two 
new questions. First, we examine whether home-country welfare unambiguously declines if 
the foreign firm chooses predation rather than accommodating the participation of the home 
firm. We conclude that predation by foreign firms may not be welfare reducing. To preempt 
participation of the home firm, the foreign firm must sell a larger quantity of its product than 
it would do to accommodate participation. The extra quantity lowers the price of the foreign 
product, and could raise the overall consumer  surplus. If this gain in consumer surplus 
outweighs the lost profit of the home firm, the home country gains from predation. Second, 
we investigate whether the home country unambiguously gains from imposing its anti-Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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predation tariff. Even with the addition of home country tariff revenue, there remains an 
inherent ambiguity concerning the impact on home-country welfare. 
There is a strand of previous literature that has explored predatory actions in an international 
context. Eaton and Mirman (1991) show that when the home firm has imperfect information 
on the state of demand in the foreign market where the foreign firm is a monopolist, the 
foreign firm may engage in signal-jamming by means of ``predatory dumping'' or over-
shipping to the home market in the first period of a two period game so as to garner a greater 
market share in the home market in the second period. Hartigan (1994) explores a price-
setting game where the home firm cannot observe whether the foreign firm has high or low 
marginal costs. Given that the home firm will exit after the first period due to negative profits 
if it is faced with a low cost foreign firm, the foreign firm may have an incentive to engage in 
signal-jamming by mimicking a low-cost, low-price firm in the first period so as to reap 
monopoly profits in the second period. In Hartigan (1996), predatory dumping may also arise 
when capital markets in the home country are imperfect and will not lend to a home firm to 
keep it solvent after the first period. In the Hartigan (1994 and 1996) articles, antidumping 
policy may increase the costs of predatory dumping and, thereby, diminish the probability of 
its occurrence. 
We build on this literature in two important directions. First we show that the foreign firm 
may preempt the participation of the home firm and engage in predation even in the presence 
of full information and perfect capital markets. In our model, the simple presence of 
economies of scale in production arising from quasi-fixed costs act as an impediment to 
participation by the home firm and provide an opportunity for predation by the foreign firm. 
Second, we also demonstrate that antidumping policy, as currently configured, provides a 
weak defense against such predation at best. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model quantity 
leadership, which generates possible predatory equilibria as well as conventional Stackelberg 
equilibria. In section 3, we investigate how the choice of tariffs affects the leadership 
behaviour of the foreign firm and the resulting equilibrium. Thereafter, in section 4 we 
determine the tariff that is just sufficient to prevent predation and then, in section 5, we 
compare the anti-predation tariff with standard and sophisticated antidumping duties. Section 
6 analyses the impact of predation and predation-preventing tariffs on national welfare and 
then section 7 provides concluding remarks. Appendices provide technical details on the Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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quantity-leadership game and outlines a price leadership game, which gives broadly similar 
results. 
 
2  A Simple Model of International Predation 
 Suppose that two firms are potential participants in an oligopoly game by merit of having 
previously incurred sunk costs. On the basis of ex ante expectations, the first firm, which is 
located in the foreign country, has invested 
hf
f y  on research and development and product 
adaptation enabling it to participate in the home market as well as the foreign market. 
Meanwhile the second firm, which is located in the home country, has invested 
h
h y  on 
research and development allowing it to participate only in the home market. We assume that 
two markets are segmented because of trade barriers, such as transport costs. At the start of 
the game, demand, production cost and transport cost parameters are revealed and become 
common knowledge. Since the realized parameters may differ from those that were expected 
when sunk costs were incurred, a firm may regret having incurred its sunk cost to become a 
potential participant, and  indeed, it may elect not to participate. Although the previous 
literature on predatory dumping frequently assumes forms of imperfect information (see 
Eaton and Mirman (1991), and Hartigan (1994)), we show that predation may arise in a 
perfect-information framework. 
After the state of the world is revealed, the government in the home country or more aptly its 
antidumping administration has the prerogative to set a tariff. For the most part, we assume 
that the government will choose to levy a tariff if there is a perceived threat of predation on 
the one hand or of dumping on the other hand. It is assumed once a tariff is set, it is not 
subject to later revision and it remains in place whatever the behavior of the foreign firm. 
Consequently the specific tariff,  t, becomes the key policy parameter in the model and we 
focus on comparisons between anti-predation and anti-dumping settings of  t.
2 
Finally, after any tariff is implemented, a one-shot quantity-leadership game is played in the 
home-country market where the foreign firm is assumed to be a quantity leader because its 
product must be shipped first. While such leadership situations may be infrequent in practice, 
they open the door to predatory behavior and, thus, still warrant careful consideration. As we 
                                                 
2The model could be expanded to allow for tariffs, which are contingent on either predatory or dumping behavior 
by the foreign firm and equal to zero in the absence of such behavior. Initial work in this direction suggests that 
qualitatively similar results would be obtained. Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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will see, the leader-follower structure implies that, even in the static setting, the foreign firm 
may engage in predatory behavior that preempts the participation of the home firm purely on 
the basis of maximizing single-period profits. Thus, higher monopoly returns in the future are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for predation to occur in the present.
3 Little additional 
complexity arises when we assume that the two firms produce differentiated products, and 
this facilitates comparison with the price-leadership variant of the model, which is presented 
in the appendix. While the main results of the price-setting game are similar to those of the 
quantity-setting game, the differences between two models will be mentioned in the text. 
To simplify comparative statics, we assume linear inverse demands and constant marginal 
costs.
4 In the region of quantity space where prices are positive, the demand functions in the 












h q q p g s q - - =   (2) 
 where the subscripts  f  and  h indicate the foreign firm and home firm respectively; the 
superscripts  f  and h represent the foreign market and home market;  p  denotes price and  q 
represents sales. With the respect to the demand parameters,  0 > b ,  0 > s , and 
2 g bs‡  so 
that the underlying utility function is concave. We also assume that  0 > g  so the products are 
at least imperfect substitutes and that  0 > a  and  0 > q  so that both varieties are desirable to 
consumers. Given that the home firm does not participate in the foreign market, the inverse 




f q p b a - =   (3) 
Production exhibits a simple form of economies of scale. We assume that a minimum startup 
amount of labor must be in place before any output is produced giving rise to quasi-fixed 
costs given by  h f  and  f f  for the home and foreign firm respectively. Since these quasi-fixed 
costs serve as a potential barrier to participation, we refer to them as participation costs. Once 
the startup labor is in place, a constant additional amount of labor is needed to produce each 
unit of output. Consequently, the foreign and home firms incur constant marginal costs, given 
by  h c  and  f c . Assuming constant marginal cost for the foreign firm simplifies the analysis 
                                                 
3Of course, in a repeated-game extension of the model, the rewards of future monopoly may act as an additional 
incentive for predation in the present period. Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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since its sales in the two markets remain independent and do not affect each other through 
rising or falling marginal costs.
5 The foreign firm also faces trade barriers on shipments to the 
home market. In addition to the specific tariff, t, a transport cost parameter, t , arises because 
a constant amount of labor is required to ship each unit of the product. 
The operating profits (exclusive of sunk costs) of the foreign firm selling in both the home 
and foreign markets, and the operating profits of the home firm, only serving the home 
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  Setting the quasi-fixed participation costs aside momentarily, the variable profit of the 








f q t c q p ] [ = + + - t p , and the variable profit of the 








h q c q p - = p . For reference purposes, we note that the 
























  (7) 
  Participation costs introduce the possibility of discontinuities in these reaction functions. For 
discussion purposes, however, we assume that the foreign firm obtains sufficiently high 
variable profits on its own market to overcome its participation costs,  f f . Consequently, the 
foreign firm will always participate in the foreign market, and its participation costs will not 
prevent it from operating in the home market. 
By contrast, the participation costs of the home firm,  h f , do act as a barrier to its participation 
in the home market, which may be used by the foreign firm to preempt participation of the 
home firm. Given the presence of participation costs, the home firm's reaction function is 
                                                                                                                                                          
4Allowing for non-linear demands does not alter our main results. 
5In contrast, a market connection through increasing marginal costs is central to the analysis of predatory 
dumping in Eaton and Mirman (1991). Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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discontinuous. In Fig. 2, which is based on Dixit (1979), 
h
f B  is the `limit' quantity for the 
foreign firm where the home firm is indifferent between participating and staying out of the 
home market. That is to say, at point A the home firm's operating profits are equal to zero by 
virtue of the participation cost. If the foreign firm's sales are higher than 
h
f B , the home firm 
has negative profit and stays out of the home market. If the foreign firm's sales are lower than 
h
f B , it is profitable for the home firm to operate in the home market. Thus, over the range of 
foreign sales from zero to 
h
f B , the home firm has a regular downward-sloping Cournot 
reaction function. In Fig. 2, the line segments  A M
h




fq B  including the end points of 
both segments indicate the home firm's reaction function. Here, 
h
f q  represents the maximum 
possible limit quantity, which would apply in the case where the home firm's participation 
costs were equal to zero. We will always assume that both 
h
h M  and 
h
f B  are strictly positive so 
that the home firm will participate in the home market for sufficiently low values of 
h
f q  on the 
interval  ] [0,
h
f B . Given that  0 >
h
h M , it follows that  0 >
h
f q  as well. 
Since we assume that the foreign firm has to ship its goods to the home market before the 
home firm, there is a quantity-leadership game, rather than a simultaneous quantity game in 
the home market. Consequently, as shown in Fig 2, the home firm is a Stackelberg follower, 
which maximizes its profits in accordance with its Cournot reaction function, given the 
foreign firm's shipments to the home market. The shipment decision of the foreign firm 
hinges on its own profits. In the home market, the foreign firm can preempt participation by 
producing slightly more than the limit output 
h
f B , or accommodate participation at the 
Stackelberg point,  S , by selling 
h
f S . The profits of the foreign firm are larger, on iso-profit 
contours that are closer to its pure monopoly point 
h
f M . Notice that the foreign firm is 
indifferent between selling at the output pair  ,0) (
h
f Z  on the iso-profit contour 
h
f CSZ  in Fig. 2, 




f S S . For reasons, which will become clear, we refer to 
h
f Z  as the 
Stackelberg trigger output. Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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Figure  2: Reaction Functions 
The following proposition based on Dixit (1979) overviews the types of equilibria, which 
arise in the model. 
 
Proposition 1 (Dixit) The following types of equilibria are possible:   













h S q = .  






f M B Z ‡ > , then the foreign firm preempts participation and sells just 




f B q = .  




f B M > , then the foreign firm monopolizes the home market and 




f M q = . 
 Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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In the accommodation scenario, which is different from that shown in Fig. 2, the home firm's 
participation costs are low and the limit output, 
h
f B , is greater than or equal to the Stackelberg 
trigger output 
h
f Z . In this case, there would be a traditional Stackelberg equilibrium because 
the foreign firm attains higher profit by selling 
h
f S  than it would if it preempted participation 
by leading an output slightly larger than 
h
f B . 
In the predation scenario, which is the one shown in Fig. 2, the home firm encounters 
moderate participation costs such that the trigger output is strictly larger than the limit output 






f M B Z ‡ > ). In this 
case, the profit that the foreign firm earns when shipping slightly more than 
h
f B  is higher than 
the profit obtained from accommodating participation at the Stackelberg equilibrium  S  as 
shown by the inner iso-profit contour. This profit is also higher than when the foreign firm 
sells quantities significantly larger than 
h
f B .
6 The foreign firm, thus, is willing to sell a 
quantity marginally greater than 
h
f B  to preempt the participation of the home firm. Such 
situations where the best strategy for the foreign firm is to preempt participation by the home 
firm will be said to constitute predation by the foreign firm. This definition of predation is 
logical. If the foreign firm raises its output from the Stackelberg level to slightly above the 
limit level, there is a persuasive argument that an otherwise viable home firm has been pushed 
out of the market. 
In the monopolization scenario, which differs from Fig. 2, the home firm has high 




f B M > . In this case, the foreign firm can attain its highest 
profit in the home market by selling at its monopoly output 
h
f M . In this scenario, the foreign 
firm monopolizes the home market since t he home firm's profit would be negative if it 
participated. It should be observed that we have excluded the monopoly case from our 
definition of predation. If the home firm can do no better than to stay out of the home market 
                                                 
6If the foreign firm sells at 
h
f B , the home firm is indifferent between participating at A or staying out at 
h
f B . 
Nevertheless, the decision to participate by the foreign firm will significantly lower the foreign firm's profit. The 
expected profit for the foreign firm with a positive probability of participation is smaller than the profit of 
preempting participation with an output marginally higher than 
h
f B . Consequently, it is reasonable that the 
foreign firm sells the quantity marginally greater than 
h
f B  instead of 
h
f B . Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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when the foreign firm chooses to sell at its monopoly point, then the home firm is simply not 
sustainable. 
Although the price-leadership game discussed in the appendix has different, somewhat more 
complex reaction functions, the reaction function for the home firm is still discontinuous due 
to its participation costs. Accordingly, predation can occur in the price-leadership game as 
well, and we obtain results similar to Prop. 1. 
 
3  The Impact of Tariffs 
 Although Dixit (1979) shows that Prop. 1 generally holds regardless of functional forms, we 
can solve the model mathematically based on linear demands and constant marginal costs for 
any particular level of tariffs. In a subsequent step, we can then analyze the effects associated 
with tariff changes. Regardless of the situation in the h ome market, the foreign firm always 




f c M b a - . 
We can also solve for the foreign firm's monopoly output in the home market using its own 
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f  (8) 
where  ] ]]/[2 [ [ = b t a m + - f c  represents the monopoly output of the foreign firm when tariffs 
are absent. For tariffs less than  bm 2 , there is a negative linear relationship between the tariff 
and the monopoly output of the foreign firm, which is shown by the  AGHF  line in Fig. 3. 
Using the home firm's standard Cournot reaction function given by Eq. (7), we can also obtain 
the monopoly output of the home firm: 
], ]/[2 [ = s q h
h
h c M -   (9) 
 which we assume is always positive. Next, we solve for the foreign firm's maximum limit 
output using the home firm's reaction function given by Eq. (7). 

















Figure  3: The impact of tariffs on shipments by the foreign firm 
We can derive the limit output  g sf q ]/ 2 [ = h h
h
f c B - -  by setting the profit of the home firm 
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f q B = . 
Of course, both the maximum limit output, 
h
f q , and the limit output, 
h
f B , are independent of 
the tariff as shown in Fig. 3. 
For an internal Stackelberg equilibrium, the leadership output of the foreign firm and the 
follower output of the home firm are as follows:
7 
        
2 4
] [ ]] [ [ 2
=
2 g bs
q g t a s
-
- - + + - h f h
f
c t c
S   (12) 
                                                 
7These Stackelberg outputs are obtained by maximizing foreign firm's profits given by Eq. (4) subject to the 
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 Making use of Eqs. (8) and (10) and allowing for the possibility of boundary equilibria leads 
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bg   (15) 
Here, the high boundary tariff,  ] ]/[2 [ ] [ = s q g t a h f c c t - - + - , can be determined by setting 
0 =
h
f S  in Eq. (12) and the low boundary tariff,  ] ]/[2 ][ [4 ] [ =
2 sg q g sb t a h f c c t - - - + - , can 




f q S = . Since we can rewrite the expression for the low boundary 
tariff as  ] ]/[ ][ [2 =
2 gs q g bs h c t t - - -  and we have the parameter restriction that 
2 g bs‡ , it 
follows that  t t > . Both  t and t could be positive, or both could be negative, or as shown in 
Fig. 3,  t could be positive while  t is negative. The foreign firm's Stackelberg leadership 
output is a linear decreasing function of the tariff over the range of tariffs,  t t t £ £ , as shown 
by the line segment  CHIJ  in Fig. 3. The foreign firm's Stackelberg output, 
h
f S , could be 
either smaller or larger than its monopoly output, 
h
f M . Subtracting 
h
f M  from the internal 
solution for 
h
f S  in Eq. (14), we obtain  /2] [ ] [2 =







f q M M S - - -
- g bs g . It is 
























f q M . 
We can also solve for the foreign firm's Stackelberg trigger output, which is given by 
intersection between the Stackelberg iso-profit contour and the horizontal axis. 
 Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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Lemma 1 The trigger output 
h
f Z  is given by Eq. (16), which is continuous in t and decreases 
monotonically from 
h
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  (16) 
(Proof: see Appendix I)  
 
In Fig. 3, the curve CDEF  shows the trigger output for values of tariffs where  bm 2 < <t t . It 
is clear from the construction of Fig. 2 that 
h
f Z  is greater than 
h
f S  or 
h
f M  for any situation 
where there is an internal Stackelberg equilibrium. 
    
Figure  4: A boundary equilibrium with  0 =
h
f S  due to a prohibitive tariff 
It is also worthwhile to examine situations where there are boundary Stackelberg equilibria in 
Eqs.(14), (15) and (16) in some depth. First consider the situation where  t t ‡ . Suppose that 




hM q  in Fig. 2 shifts inwards, perhaps due to a 
higher tariff, such that 
h
h q  and 
h
h M  coincide as shown in Fig. 4.
8 In this case, the zero iso-
                                                 




h q M = ,  t t = , which just meets the requirement for the boundary Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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profit contour for the foreign firm in the home market is given by the vertical axis where 
0 =
h




hZ q . On the vertical axis, zero profit results from zero sales, 




hZ q , the price of the foreign good is equal to the unit cost of exports 
(i.e., both the marginal and the average costs) such that its profit is equal to zero in the home 




hq M , 
there is a boundary Stackelberg equilibrium at  S . The foreign firm can not do better than 
leading with a quantity  0 =
h
f S  and earning zero profit on the home market. Consequently the 








hM q  shifts in 
further to  1 1M D  in Fig. 4 due to a further increase in the tariff, the Stackelberg equilibrium 
remains at  S , because this position is still consistent with zero profits for the foreign firm. 
Although we continue to have  0 =
h




h M S = , 
h




f M Z 2 =  moves toward the origin to  1 Z . Consequently, the line segment  EF  in Fig. 3 
shows the trigger output in boundary situations where  bm 2 < t t £ .
9 
Next consider the second boundary Stackelberg equilibrium that arises when  t t £ . If the 




hM q  in Fig. 2 were to shift outwards to a 
sufficient extent, say due to lower tariffs or higher import subsidies, an iso-profit contour for 





hq M  at the horizontal intercept (not shown in the figures). Consequently, there 






f q Z S = =  and  0 =
h
h S . Subsequent 
outward shifts of the foreign firm reaction function leave all facets of these boundary 




f q M = . Thereafter, further outward shifts of the 







f M Z S = =  and  0 =
h
h S . The line segment  AC shows values of the Stackelberg 
                                                                                                                                                          
equilibrium. 








f S M M Z , but if  bm 2 ‡ t , then 












f S , and the trigger output, 
h
f Z , for the boundary equilibrium where 
t t q
h
f £ - < ] [ 2 m b .
10 
 
4  Using tariffs to counteract predation 
 Since a tariff raises the effective marginal cost of the foreign firm in the home market, tariffs 
could be used to prevent either monopoly or predation. 
 
Proposition 2 Consider participation costs of the home firm that are positive but allow for 
the possible participation of the home firm such that  ] /[4 ] [ < < 0
2 s q f h h c - .   
    1. There exists a unique (positive or negative) anti-monopoly tariff, 




f M B ‡  
if and only if 
* t t ‡ .  
    2. There exists a unique (positive or negative) anti-predation tariff, 




f Z B ‡  if and only if 
* * t t ‡ .  
  (Proof: see Appendix I) 
 
Fig. 3 illustrates the results of Prop. 2. For the value of limit output, 
h
f B  arising from the home 
firm's participation costs, if 
* <t t , the foreign firm monopolizes the market with shipments 
determined by the line segment  AG. If 
* * * < t t t £ , there is a predatory behavior by the 
foreign firm, which produces an output slightly above 
h
f B . The figure is shown  for the 
parameter values such that predation exists when  0 = t . Finally, if 
* * t t ‡  the foreign firm 
accommodates participation by the home firm. When the tariff reaches 
* * t , there is a discrete 
decline in output from  D to  I  as the foreign firm accommodates the participation of the 
home firm. For tariffs on the interval from 
* * t  to  t the line IJ  shows the shipment of the 
foreign firm. For tariffs at  t or above, the leadership output of the foreign firm is equal to 
zero. While the figure shows a case where the high boundary tariff,  t, happens to exceed the 
                                                 
10Provided that  t t q
h








f M q S Z > = = , but if  ] [ 2
h








f q M S Z ‡ = = . Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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anti-predation tariff, 
* * t , and the anti-monopoly tariff, 
* t , for higher levels of participation 
costs and thus lower levels of the limit output, it is possible to have 
* * * > > t t t  or even 
t t t > >
* * * . This implies that if the home government imposes an anti-predation tariff, there 
are situations where the foreign firm will immediately accommodate the participation of the 
home firm by leading with an output that is equal to zero, rather than positive. In other words, 
an anti-predation tariff may not be prohibitive in some circumstances, but it will be in other 
circumstances. 
Since a tariff raises the effective marginal cost of the foreign firm in the home market, Prop. 2 
reveals that the home government can levy a tariff high enough to preclude predation. 
Moreover, in the price-leadership game, the similar proposition applies, because this result 
relies primarily on Prop. 1. 
While the analysis has been primarily concerned about tariffs and quantities, which the 
foreign firm ships, it is important to also consider the implications for pricing by the foreign 
firm. 
 
Proposition 3 Changes in the tariff affect the price of the foreign product as follows:  
    1. Monopolization: If the foreign firm monopolizes the home market because 
* <t t , then 
the foreign firm's price is increasing in the tariff, such that  0 > /dt dp
h
f .  
    2. Predation: If the foreign firm preempts the participation of the home firm because 
* * * < t t t £ , then the foreign firm's price remains constant as the tariff increases such that 
),0) ( ( = ,0) ( =










f e -  and  0 = /dt dp
h
f .  
    3. Accommodation: If 
* * t t ‡ , there are two possible sub-cases of accommodating behavior. 
a) Following Brander and Spencer(1981, p. 379), whenever there exists an interval  t t t <
* * £  
such that the foreign firm accommodates with positive output, then 
,0) ( > )) ( ), ( (









f B p t S t S p  and  0 > /dt dp
h
f . b) Whenever 
* * t t ‡  and  t t ‡  such that the 






f M p p ‡ , which is 








f M p B p ‡  if and only if  t t ‡
* * .  
  (Proof: see Appendix I) 
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Figure  5: The impact of tariffs on the price of foreign product 
Fig. 5 establishes the relation between the price of the foreign product and the tariff for the 
case where  t t <
* * . For a small tariff less than 
* t , the foreign firm monopolizes the home 
market, and the price is less than  1 p . As the tariff rises, the monopoly output falls, the price 
rises, and the foreign firm's profits fall. When  t reaches 
* t , the home firm would be able to 
enter the home market with a positive output if the foreign firm continues with its monopoly 
output and price. Consequently, the foreign firm produces slightly more than the limit output 
and charges a price equal to  1 p  to preempt participation by the home firm. Further increases 
in the tariff leaves the foreign firm's output unchanged and its price constant at  1 p , but its 
profitability continues to decline. When the tariff reaches 
* * t , it becomes more profitable for 
the foreign firm to accommodate participation by the home firm. Thus, there is a discrete 
decline in the foreign firm's output. In the case shown in Fig 5, where 
* * >t t , the foreign 
firm's Stackelberg leadership output remains positive at 
* * t  and there is a discrete jump in the 
price to  2 p . Yet, further increases in the tariff reduce the Stackelberg leadership output and 
increase the price. Profits also fall. When the tariff reaches  t, the Stackelberg leadership 
output is equal to zero, which implies that the prices are greater than or equal to  3 p . The 
appendix shows that broadly similar results can be obtained for the price-leadership model. Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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5  Dumping versus Predation 
  As we have seen, dumping is defined to exist when a firm in one country exports its product 
to another country at a price below that which it normally charges in its own country (price-
based dumping) or below its average costs of production (cost-based dumping). For the most 
part, we will focus on price-based dumping. Price-based dumping is said to occur whenever 





f p p D - +t   (17) 
 is positive. In other words, dumping exists if the foreign firm charges lower price on the 
home market than the price on its own market adjusted for transport costs. If dumping is 
detected, the home country is usually able to impose an antidumping duty.
11 
We consider two types of antidumping duties. First, we define a standard or partial 
antidumping duty,  0) = ( = t D t
padd , which is equal to the dumping margin when the tariff is 
equal to zero. Second, we define a sophisticated or full antidumping duty, 
fadd t , to be the 
minimum tariff that would generate a dumping margin that is less than or equal to zero.
12 
While f ull antidumping duties are attractive from a theoretical standpoint, almost all 
antidumping duties that are implemented in practice are, at least initially, partial antidumping 
duties.
13 
                                                 
11In addition to a positive dumping margin, authorities must also show that there is material injury or a threat of 
material injury to the home industry. In practice, a `But-For' approach is generally used to define material injury. 
In this approach, the authority conducts a counter-factual analysis to compare conditions of the targeted industry 
in the presence of dumped goods with an estimate of conditions of the industry without such goods. Material 
injury is said to exist when the targeted home industry would have been better off `but for' the sales of dumped 
commodities. In our model, material injury always occurs because the home firm would have enjoyed monopoly 
profit if the foreign firm did not participate. Hence, we assume that antidumping duties are always allowable if 
the dumping margin is positive. 
12In the model, there are some situations where there will be a single tariff, or a range of tariffs, that result in a 
dumping margin exactly equal to zero, but in other situations, the smallest tariff that stops dumping leads to a 
negative dumping margin. 
13The antidumping authority may periodically review the situation and increase the duty if it finds that dumping 
persists in spite of the initial duty. Such an iterative reviewing and resetting procedure may, in some situations, 
approximate a full antidumping duty. Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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Dumping and predation depend on different criteria. Predation hinges on the relationship 
between the limit output, 
h
f B , and the trigger output, 
h
f Z , in accordance with Prop. 1. 
Consequently, the predation criterion depends on the cost parameters of both firms and 
demand parameters of the home market. While the demand parameters of the foreign market 
are irrelevant to predation, they have a role in the price comparison that comprises the 
dumping criterion. This observation leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4 Dumping and predation are separate and distinct matters: 
    1. Dumping and predation may coexist.  
    2. Predation may occur when dumping does not.  
    3. Dumping may occur when predation does not.  
    4. Neither dumping nor predation may occur.  






f Z B M < £ , then predation occurs. 




f M p , we have 








f B p M p D , which could be greater or less than zero. Thus, when 





f B Z £ , then predation does not occur. The dumping margin, 










f S S p M p D - +t , once again, could be greater or less than zero, which 
establishes situation 3 and 4.  D  
 
 Tab. 1 summarizes situations in Prop. 4, and also invites further consideration of the situation 
where the dumping and predation coexist. 
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Table  1: predation, dumping, and antidumping duties 
  Predation 
  Yes  No 
 
Yes 
Situation 1: An anti-dumping duty may 
or may not prevent predation 
 
Situation 2: An anti-dumping duty may 










Situation 3: No dumping duty to 
prevent predation 
Situation 4: No dumping duty and no 
predation 
 
Proposition 5 Suppose that dumping and predation coexist when  0 = t .   
    1. A standard or partial antidumping duty will lead to accommodation if and only if it 
happens to exceed the anti-predation tariff, 
* * t .  
    2. A sophisticated or full antidumping duty always leads to accommodation.  
Proof: The first part of proposition follows immediately from Prop. 2. Next, the full 
antidumping tariff, 
fadd t , is by definition the minimum tariff such that  0 £ D . Since there is 
predation when  0 = t , we have 
* * * < 0 < t t . Since 
f
f p  is always independent of  t and 
h
f p  is 
constant for all values of  t such that 
* * * < t t t £  by Prop. 3, it follows from Eq. (17) the 
dumping margin is constant as well. Consequently, if there is dumping when  0 = t , then 
dumping persists so long as 
* * <t t , which establishes that 
fadd t  is greater than or equal to 
* * t . 
D 
 
Overall, these results suggest that antidumping policies cannot be justified on the basis of 
preventing predatory behavior by foreign firms. In accordance with Prop. 4, antidumping 
duties are permissible in some situations where there is no predation, and predation may exist 
in other situations where antidumping duties are not permissible. Even when dumping and 
predation coexist, Prop. 5 implies that a partial antidumping duty may either be too small to 
prevent predation or unnecessarily large. Finally, if predation and dumping coexist in the 
initial zero-tariff equilibrium, a full antidumping duty will prevent predation, but it may be Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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unnecessarily large in the sense of being greater than 
* * t . Further, full antidumping duties 
appear to be of limited practical importance in this context because of calculation 
difficulties.
14 
Similar results apply in the case of cost-based dumping. Suppose that the foreign firm has no 
sales in its own country so that the price-based dumping criterion cannot be used. Rather than 
being based on the price of the foreign firm on its own market, the dumping margin given by 




f f q c ]/ [ f y t + + + , where 
h
f y  
represents the sunk costs of the foreign firm. Since the foreign firm's average cost of 
exporting depends on its participation and sunk costs, the cost-based dumping criterion differs 
qualitatively from the predation criterion. Consequently, Prop. 4 and Prop. 5 go through for 
cost-based dumping as well as price-based dumping. Appendix II indicates that there is a 
similar non-equivalence between anti-predation tariffs and antidumping duties in a price-
leadership game. 
 
6  Welfare Analysis 
  It is i mportant to consider whether predatory behavior by the foreign firm necessarily 
reduces welfare in the home country. The home country's quasi-linear utility function, which 
generates the simple linear demand system given by Eqs. (1) and (2), can be written as: 




f +   (18) 
                                                 
14It is apparent from Eq. (17) that an antidumping duty may be applied in a situation where the foreign firm 
monopolizes the home market in an initial zero-tariff situation. While foreign monopoly and predation are 
mutually-exclusive states that are connected in accordance with Prop. 1, foreign monopoly as well as predation 
is separate and distinct from dumping. Consequently, even if foreign monopoly and dumping happen to coexist, 
a partial antidumping duty may be less than or equal to 
* t  as well as 
* * t . This implies that a partial antidumping 
duty may not eliminate foreign monopoly. If monopoly does happen to be eliminated, predation may persist. 
Finally, even if predation is eliminated, the duty may be unnecessarily large. While this implies that the central 
tenet of the first part of Prop. 5 remains in force, the second part breaks down. Starting from a position of foreign 
monopoly where  0 >
* t , a full antidumping duty may not be sufficient to cause accommodating behavior. 
Under foreign monopoly, a tariff raises the foreign firm's price and may eliminate the dumping margin before the 
anti-monopoly tariff 
* t  is reached. Thus, foreign monopoly may persist, and accommodation may not occur. Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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 where  0 q  is the consumption of a competitive numeraire good.
15 Quasi-linear utility is useful 
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f B q @  and  0 =
h
h q , the home country's welfare,  B W , depends on 









h S q = , the home country's welfare,  S W , is obtained 
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  Taking the difference between home-country welfare under predation versus accommodation 
and adding and subtracting 
h
h f S c ] [ t +  yields:  

























h f h t B t t S t S S c c f p p t + - + + - + )} ,0, ( ) ), ( ), ( ( { } ]] [ {[  (23) 
 To assist with welfare comparisons, we define a benchmark situation where: (a) the high 
boundary tariff for an internal Stackelberg equilibrium exceeds the anti-predation tariff such 
                                                 
15While we could write  ] ) ( 2 ) ( [
2
1
















f q q q q q q q q u s g b q a + + - + , we do not need the 
specific function form to derive our results. 
16Consumer surplus equals the area below the Marshallian demand function minus costs of purchasing goods. 
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that 
* * t t ‡ , (b) the foreign firm has a cost advantage in the sense that  h f c c £ +t  and (c) the 
goods are perfect substitutes such that  q a =  and  g s b = = . 
We begin with a comparative welfare result that is similar to Brander and Spencer (1981, p. 
380). 
 
Proposition 6 (Brander and Spencer) Ceteris paribus, home-country welfare may (or may 
not) be higher if the foreign firm were to choose predation rather than accommodation such 
that  ) ( ) ( t W t W S B -  may (or may not) be positive. 
 Proof: In addition to the benchmark conditions, consider a tariff,  t, in the neighborhood of 
* * t . With 
* * t t ‡ , we have the accommodation price for the foreign firm greater than its 










f B p S S p ‡ . Since the goods are perfect 












f S S u B u ‡ . Further, under 






f S S B + -  additional 
goods is greater than the increment to cost from producing them. This makes the terms within 
the first set of curly brackets in Eq.(23) greater than or equal to zero. Next, we observe that 
the terms in the second set of curly brackets are greater than or equal to zero if the foreign 
firm has a cost advantage. Further, for an tariff in the vicinity of 
* * t , the profit of the foreign 
firm are approximately equal under predation and accommodation making the terms in the 
third set of curly brackets approximately equal to zero. Since we have  0 > h f , it now follows 
that welfare is higher if the foreign firm chooses predation because  0 > S B W W - . Finally, this 
inequality can clearly be reversed by sufficiently large departures from the benchmark 
conditions (a)-(c) or tariffs sufficiently smaller than 
* * t . D 
Of course, the foreign firm, not the home country, chooses whether there will be a state of 
accommodation, predation, or indeed, foreign monopoly. Now suppose that the foreign firm 
would choose predation when the home-country tariff is set equal to zero. From Prop. 2, the 
home country could prevent predation by imposing its anti-predation tariff, 
* * t . Consequently, 
it is important to compare home-country welfare under predation with a tariff equal to zero 
with welfare under accommodation with a tariff equal to 
* * t . D 
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Proposition 7 National welfare under the predation regime at the zero tariff may (or may not) 
be higher than u nder the accommodation regime at the anti-predation tariff such that 
) = ( 0) = (
* * t t W t W S B -  may (or may not) be greater than zero.   
Proof: We can write  )} ( ) ( { )} ( (0) { = ) ( (0)
* * * * * * * * t W t W t W W t W W S B B B S B - + - - . From the proof 
of Prop. 6,  0 > ) ( ) (
* * * *
h S B t W t W f ‡ -  in the benchmark situation. Since w e have 
0 > = /
h
f B B dt dW  from Eq. (21), it follows that 
h
f B B B t t W W
* * * * = ) ( (0) - - . For parameter 
values where 
* * t  is sufficiently small, 
h
f h B t
* * > f  making welfare higher under predation 
without a tariff than in a Stackelberg equilibrium with a tariff equal to 
* * t . Either deviations 
from the benchmark conditions or larger values of 
* * t  can clearly lead to greater welfare 
under accommodation with the anti-predation tariff.  D 
 
In Appendix I, we extend these results by showing that the home country may be better off 
assessing its best tariff consistent with predation rather than its best tariff consistent with 
accommodation. While countries may wish to prevent predation on producer-fairness 
grounds, Prop. 7 implies that preventing predation is not necessarily in the national interest. 
 
7  Conclusion 
 This paper investigates the relation between antidumping duties and predatory behavior by 
foreign firms in a context that is new to the literature. The prior literature on predatory 
dumping emphasizes multi-period models where future monopolization, or at least increased 
market share is the motivation for predation in the present period. For example, in Eaton and 
Mirman (1991) the foreign firm is able to exploit asymmetric information concerning its own 
market, while in Hartigan (1996) the home firm is vulnerable to predation due to the financial 
market imperfections. By contrast, we show that predation can arise in a simple one-shot 
game with perfect information that adapts the Stackelberg entry deterrence framework 
developed by Dixit (1979) and Brander and Spencer (1981). In this setting, the foreign firm is 
a first mover and, under some conditions, may use its leadership position to force the home 
firm out of the market.  
Antidumping duties, however, turn out to be a dubious weapon for combating such predation. 
We show that under some circumstances, an antidumping duty is implemented in the absence 
of predation, and under other circumstances, no dumping duty will be imposed in the presence Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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of predation. Even when the underlying conditions favor predation by foreign firms and 
governments do impose antidumping duties on foreign goods, simple duties, which are 
typically used in practice, may not be sufficient to preclude predation. Further, while 
sophisticated duties, which are designed to eliminate dumping, are sufficient to prevent 
dumping, such duties are generally larger than necessary. Although there is no substantial 
evidence that predation by foreign firms is widespread in reality, the results of our modeling, 
thus, suggest that antidumping duties cannot be justified as a policy mechanism to prevent 
predation. While antidumping duties are supposed to offset unfair pricing practices by foreign 
firms, they generally punish foreign firms for activities such as price discrimination and 
selling below costs, which are generally both acceptable and legal for home firms. 
We also extend welfare analysis in Brander and Spencer (1981) to address two new issues. 
First, we find that home-country welfare may be higher if the foreign firm were to choose 
predation rather than accommodation. Second, we show that, even when the foreign firm 
would choose predation, the home country does not inevitably gain by i mposing an anti-
predation tariff, which induces accommodating behavior by the foreign firm. Consequently, 
while preventing predation always serves the interest of the home firms, it does not always 
necessarily serve the national interest. 
The model could be adapted to incorporate tariffs that are contingent on the presence of either 
predation or dumping. This would allow somewhat richer profit-maximizing behavior on the 
part of the foreign firm since it could exempt itself from tariffs by choosing not to predate on 
the one hand or dump on the other hand.
17 Nevertheless, it appears that our key qualitative 
results will continue to hold because the differences between the predation versus dumping 
criteria will continue to lead to separate and distinct anti-predation versus anti-dumping 
tariffs.  
The model could also be extended to allow a repeated-game structure. Suppose that the home 
firm's participant-status lapses if it remains out of the market for a sufficient duration. On the 
one hand, depending on its expectations of future market and cost parameters, there may be an 
added incentive for the home firm to participate in the present period so as to maintain its 
status. On the other hand, the prospect of future monopolization is likely to provide additional 
incentive for present predation by the foreign firm. Further, the possibility of future 
                                                 
17Indeed, with appropriate contingent tariffs set by the government, the foreign firm would choose not to predate 
or dump and, thus, would be exempt from tariff charges. Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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monopolization complicates the national welfare picture for the home country and it appears 
to make it more likely that preventing predation would be in the national interest. 
While current antidumping policies are poorly designed for handling predation by foreign 
firms, the prognosis for policy reform remains problematic. Detecting truly predatory 
behavior by any firms, whether home or foreign, is typically very difficult in practice. In the 
international arena, it may be hard to differentiate between situations of foreign monopoly and 
foreign predation. For example, it may be politically and economically difficult to establish 
whether a home firm is no longer viable given the current market and cost conditions. Once 
predation has been detected, there is not a straightforward formula for the anti-predation tariff 
even in the simple world of linear demands and constant costs, which we model. This 
suggests that to the extent that trade policy has a role in fighting predation by foreign firms, 
import quotas may be more appropriate instruments than tariffs.
18 More broadly, the regular 
instruments of competition policy seem likely to be a better first-line of defense against 
foreign as well as home predation. Trade policy measures could simply be held in reserve in 
the case of non-compliance by the foreign firms. 
 
                                                 




f B Z >  so that the predation would occur in the quantity game. Predation would be 
forestalled without having to accurately determine 
h
f Z  if an import quota were set anywhere between 
h
f S  and 
h
f B . In the price-leadership game, the similar argument might be made in favor of floor prices rather than tariffs. Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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Appendix 
Appendix I: The Quantity-Leadership Game; Further Details 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
We begin with the derivation of Eq. (16) using a three-step procedure: (i) we determine the 
Stackelberg profit level of the foreign firm by substituting the Stackelberg quantities into Eq. 
(4), (ii) we then insert this profit level back into Eq. (4) to determine the equation for the 
Stackelberg iso-profit curve, and (iii) we finally set 
h
h q  equal to zero and solve for 
h
f q  using 
the quadratic formula. The details of this calculation are shown in the appendix. Note that the 
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Proof of Lemma 1 
Continuity follows directly from Eq. (16). We consider monotonicity in two steps. First, 
differentiating Eq. (16) on the interval  t t t £ <  and using Eqs. (8) and (14), we obtain 
]]
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f Z  is greater than either 
h
f S  or 
h
f M  whenever there is 




f . Second, 
differentiating Eq. (16) over the interval where  bm 2 < t t £  and 
h
f M  is positive, we obtain 




f , which is less than zero.  D 
 
Proof of Prop. 2 




f q B < < 0  with 
h
f B  independent of  t. To establish the first part of 
the proposition, we deduce from Eq. (8) that  0 =
h
f M  when  bm 2 = t  and that in the limit as t 
approaches  ] [ 2
h




f q M = . Since 
h
f M  is continuous in  t, we know that 
there exists 




f B t M = ) (
* . Further, since  ) (t M
h
f  decreases linearly in  t such that 
0 < ] 1/[2 = / b - dt dM
h
f , it follows that 
* t  is unique. If and only if 




f M B ‡ , 
and thus monopoly is eliminated in accordance with Prop. 1. 
Turning to the second part of the proposition, we know from Lemma 1 that 
h
f Z  continuously 
decreases from 
h
f q  to 0 over the interval  bm 2 < <t t . Consequently, there exists a unique 





f B t Z = ) ( . If and only if 




f Z B ‡ , and thus predation is eliminated 
in accordance with Prop. 1. Finally, since we have  ) ( > ) ( =






f  and  dt dM
h
f/  is 
negative, it follows that 
* t  must be less than 
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Proof of Prop. 3 
1. If 
* <t t , then by Prop.2, the foreign firm monopolizes the market, and  0 =
h








f  in accordance with Eq. (8), we obtain  0 > 1/2 = /dt dp
h
f  from Eq. (1). 
2. If 
* * * < t t t £ , then by Prop.2, the foreign firm preempts participation and produces a 
quantity slightly larger than 
h
f B  with 
h
h q  remaining equal to zero. Consequently, 




f B p , which is independent of  t. 
3. If 
* * t t ‡ , by Prop. 2 the foreign firm accommodates participation. For sub-case a), we 
follow Brander and Spencer (1981, p. 379). When  t t t <
* * £ , Prop. 2 implies there is 
accommodation, and Eq. (14) implies that the Stackelberg leadership output is strictly 
positive. When 
* * =t t , the foreign firm would earn the same profits at the Stackelberg 
equilibrium as it would as lone firm with an output  ) ( =



















f B t c B p S t c S S p ]] [ ,0) ( [ = ]] [ ) , ( [ t t + + - + + - . Since the unit costs are the 
same and the definition of 
* * t  implies that  ) ( > ) ( =






f , it follows that 
,0) ( > )) ( ), ( (









f B p t S t S p . Further, routine calculations using Eqs. (1), (12), and (13) 
reveal that  0 > 1/2 = /dt dp
h
f  for an internal Stackelberg equilibrium. 
b) When 
* * t t ‡  there is accommodation in accordance with Prop. 2 and when  t t ‡  the 
Stackelberg leadership quantity is equal to zero. In this boundary situation, the Stackelberg 
follower output is equal to 
h
h M  in accordance with Eq. (15). Consequently, any price for the 




f M p  is consistent with 
the foreign firm staying out of the market. Since 
h
h M  is independent of  t from Eq. (9), it 
















f M M p g a - = ) (0,  in the Stackelberg 
equilibrium where the leadership output is equal to zero. Consequently, 












f M B £ . We know that when  t t =  the vertical 
intercept of the foreign firm's Cournot reaction function is 
h
h M  and the horizontal intercept is 
) (t M
h
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* * , if 








f M p B p . Since  ) (t Z
h
f  is declining in  t in 
accordance with Lemma 1,  ) ( < ) ( =














f M p B p  if and only if 
* * <t t . D 
 
Further Welfare Results 
We can easily elaborate on section 6 in the text by comparing home-country welfare with an 
optimal tariff in the state of predation with welfare with an optimal tariff in the state of 
accommodation. To begin with, we maximize the home-country welfare under both predation 
and accommodation to determine these two optimal tariffs. 
 
Lemma 2     
    1. Following Brander and Spencer (1981), the optimal tariff under predation is marginally 
lower than the anti-predation tariff, 
* * t .  
    2. The optimal tariff under accommodation, 
S t , is greater than or equal to the anti-predation 
tariff, 
* * t .  
Proof: The proof of the first part of the lemma is straightforward. Since  0 > = /
h
f B B dt dM  in 
accordance with Eq. (21), home-country welfare is always increasing in  t under predation. 
Consequently, the optimal tariff under predation is the maximum of predation-consistent 
tariff, which is a tariff marginally lower than the anti-predation tariff, 
* * t . 
To prove the second part of the lemma, we maximize the home-country welfare under 
accommodation  ) (t WS  subject to the inequality  t t £
* *  according to Prop. 2. For simplicity 
consider the situation where (a) the high boundary tariff for an internal Stackelberg 
equilibrium exceeds the anti-predation tariff such that 
* * t t ‡ , and (b) the goods are perfect 
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h f c c
t
- + - t a
 such that  0 =
) (
dt
t dW S S . Since this 
tariff does not depend on the participation cost of the home firm,  h f , it could be smaller or 
larger than the anti-predation tariff 
* * t . Consequently, we could have an internal solution for 
the optimal tariff under accommodation such that 
* * > t t
S , or boundary solution where 
* * = t t
S . D 
 
Corollary 5.1 National welfare with the optimal tariff under the predation regime may (or 
may not) be higher than welfare with the optimal tariff under the accommodation regime  S t  
such that  ) ( ) (
* * S
S B t W t W -  may (or may not) be greater than zero. 
Proof: We can write  )} ( ) ( { )} ( ) ( { = ) ( ) (
* * * * * * * * S
S S S B
S
S B t W t W t W t W t W t W - + - - . Prop. 6 
establishes that in the benchmark situation,  0 > ) ( ) (
* * * *
h S B t W t W f e e ‡ - - - . Meanwhile, the 
proof of Lemma 2 implies that under the benchmark conditions there is a value of the 
participation cost of the home firm,  h f , such that 
S t t =
* *  and, thus,  0 = ) ( ) (
* * S
S S t W t W - . 
Thus,  ) ( ) (
* * S
S B t W t W -  may be greater than zero. Sufficiently large deviations from any of the 
benchmark conditions or 
S t  sufficiently larger than 
* * t  can lead to greater welfare with the 
optimal tariff under accommodation.  D 
 
Appendix II: A Price-Leadership Game 
With other aspects of the model remaining the same, suppose there is now a price-leadership 
game where the foreign firm is still the leader and the home firm is still the follower. Fig. 6 
illustrates simple geometric solutions for the home market. We focus on the area OFGK, 
where both firms sell positive quantities in the home market. The home firm, once again, has 
a discontinuous reaction function due to participation  costs. In Fig. 6,  FB and  EWXY  
including the end points of both segments indicate the home firm's reaction function. Note 
that there is a kink at point  W  on the home firm reaction function, where the foreign firm 
ceases to produce, because the home firm's iso-profit curve is vertical at this point. This 
contour intersects the  0 =
h
f q  line again above the right of the home firm's pure monopoly 
point  X  as shown in Fig. 6. 




Figure  6: Reaction Functions 
 
Depending on relative profitability, the foreign firm will monopolize the home market, 
preempt participation or accommodate participation. 
 
Proposition 8  The equilibria under the price leadership are as follows:   




f z b £ , then the foreign firm accommodates participation and sets 
the leadership price at 
h
f s , while the home firm sets the price at 
h
h s .  






f m b z £ < , then the f oreign firm preempts participation and sets the 
price marginally lower than the limit price, 
h
f b .  




f m b > , then the foreign firm monopolizes the home market and 
sets the monopoly price at 
h
f m .  Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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Prop. 8 is clearly similar to Prop. 1. In addition, it is straightforward to show that there is still 
a well-defined anti-monopoly tariff and an anti-predation tariff. There is also a high boundary 
tariff  t, which would displace the Stackelberg point  S  to point W  where the foreign firm's 
output is equal to zero.
19 In addition, we can define a home-firm monopoly tariff,  t t > ~ , 
which is just large enough to keep the foreign firm out of the market and allow the home firm 
to set the monopoly price. This leads to the following proposition describing the relation 
between the tariff t and the price of the foreign product 
h
f p . 
 
Proposition 9 Changes in the tariff affect the price of the foreign product as follows:   
    1. Monopolization: If 
* <t t , then we have  0 > /dt dp
h
f  with the foreign firm monopolizing 
the home market.  
    2. Predation: If 
* * * < t t t £ , then the foreign firm preempts the participation of the home 
firm with  ) ( = =






f e -  and  0 = /dt dp
h
f .  
    3. Accommodation: If 
* * t t ‡ , there are three possible sub-cases of accommodating 
behavior: a) Whenever there exists an interval  t t t <
* * £ , the foreign firm leads with a price 




f b t s > ) (
* *  and  0 > /dt ds
h
f . b) 
Whenever there exists an interval such that  t t t ~ < £  and 
* * t t ‡ , the foreign firm leads with a 
price that implies zero sales but still requires the home firm's price to be less than its 
monopoly level. In this situation,  0 > /dt ds
h
f . Further, if  t t t ~ <




f b t s = ) (
* * . c) 
Whenever,  t t ~ ‡  and 
* * t t ‡ , the foreign firm leads with a price that implies zero sales and 






f x t s p = ) ~ ( ‡ , 




f x b >  if and only if  t t ~ * * ‡ .  
Prop. 9 can be established by referring to Fig. 5. Because of the similarity between Prop. 9 
and Prop. 3, the remaining analysis of the price-leadership game is analogous to the quantity-
leadership game and need not be repeated. 
                                                 
19There is also a low boundary tariff t, which is necessarily negative that would induce the foreign firm to lead 
with the price that is sufficiently negative for the home firm to abandon the market even if its participation cost 
were equal to zero. Gaisford, Jiang, Lutz: Antidumping & Predation 
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